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In this era of globalization, the models of culture in terms of
value orientations (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1990) that have tradi-
tionally dominated organizational behavior research increasingly
appear incomplete. These models portray culture as carried by
traits—stable, general preferences—that reproduce themselves
with the socialization of each new generation. But cultural inﬂu-
ences on individual judgment and behavior are dynamic and situ-
ational rather than stable and general, especially as people
increasingly span multiple cultures. Managers today switch
between cultural codes from one interaction to the next to mesh
with different audiences (Friedman, Liu, Chi, Hong, & Sung, 2012;
Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000), sometimes defy cul-
tural expectations to be contrarian (Mok & Morris, 2010a, 2010b,
2013), and even combine elements from multiple cultures to gen-
erate creative solutions (Cheng, Sanchez-Burks, & Lee, 2008;
Tadmor, Galinsky, & Maddux, 2012; Yagi & Kleinberg, 2011). Nor
does the trait model of self-replicating cultural systems fully cap-
ture cultural phenomena at the macro level. Collective-levelcultural patterns transform and spread across the decades
(Grossmann & Varnum, 2015; Boyd & Richerson, 2004) in
part because of inter-cultural interactions, which globalization
has intensiﬁed (Appadurai, 1996; Finnemore, 1996; Griswold,
2012).
While value models served well to portray cultural differences,
they do not serve as well to capture cultural dynamics. That is, nei-
ther micro-level cultural dynamics—the ways individuals acquire,
utilize and mutate their cultural assumptions and habits—nor
macro-level cultural dynamics—the ways in which cultural
practices and institutions spread and change over time—lend
themselves to explanations in terms of self-replicating systems of
private value orientations (Morris, Chiu, & Liu, 2015; Weber &
Dacin, 2011). Just as globalization has oriented academics toward
questions of cultural dynamics, these questions have become
equally pressing for practitioners—managers are called upon to
acquire new cultural proﬁciencies and deploy them in contextually
sensitive ways (Morris, Savani, Mor, & Cho, 2014) while leaders are
challenged to understand and orchestrate collective-level changes
in the cultures of corporations, industries and communities
(Kotter & Heskett, 1992; O’Reilly, Caldwell, Chatman, & Doerr,
2014; Sturman, Shao, & Katz, 2012).
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values. Norm models hold that a community’s characteristic pat-
terns of thought and behavior emanate not from individuals’ inner
core selves but from their shared social context. Norms are social
patterns that govern behavior. Because norms are conceptualized
as context-speciﬁc regulators of behavior rather than as traits, they
may offer more potential to understand how cultural patterns vary
across situations and contexts both for individuals (Bagozzi, Wong,
Abe, & Bergami, 2000; Henrich et al., 2005) and for teams (Gelfand,
Brett, Imai, Tsai, & Huang, 2013). Models of behavior as hinging on
social perceptions of other people offer more insights into how cul-
tural patterns change, such as why some longstanding practices
persist while others degrade or spread to new populations (e.g.,
Berger & Heath, 2008; Gelfand et al., 2011; Kuran & Sunstein,
1999; Richerson & Boyd, 2005).
However, the science of norms—normology—remains underde-
veloped. Beyond the central feature that norms are social patterns
that govern behavior, scholars disagree about how to deﬁne and
study norms. Norms fall at the boundaries and interstices of the
social sciences. Research is scattered across disparate literatures
in sociology (Parsons & Shils, 1951), anthropology (Geertz, 1973),
economics (Akerlof, 1976), political science (Axelrod, 1985), psy-
chology (Ajzen, 1991; Cialdini, Reno, & Kallgren, 1990), public
health (Neighbors et al., 2008), organizational behavior (Pillutla &
Chen, 1999), and marketing (Englis & Solomon, 1995). Some disci-
plines, such as economics, study norms in the objective patterns of
behavior in a social environment. Other disciplines, such as psy-
chology, equate norms with subjective beliefs, perceptions and
expectations. Narrow disciplinary views of norms are unfortunate
in our view, as normology requires understanding how objective
and subjective elements work together. The ﬁrst aim of this article
is to integrate constructs from different literatures into a general
framework that captures the important elements of norms and
their links to historical and ecological antecedents and behavioral
consequences.
While norm research has been scattered across different disci-
plines, many valuable insights have emerged about processes
through which norms inﬂuence behavior. These proposals—some
overlapping, some distinct—go under a wide array of labels, such
as conformity, peer pressure, self-stereotyping, coordination, herd-
ing, social proof, and identity signaling (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004;
Hechter &Opp, 2001). The second aim of this article is to distinguish
major theories about why people adhere to norms—both classic
accounts and emerging theories. As we shall see, there is evidence
for multiple mechanisms that operate under different conditions.
For each mechanism we suggest ways that it may elucidate the
micro level dynamics of cultural acquisition and inﬂuence and the
macro level dynamics of cultural transmission and change.
To motivate this integration of norm research for understanding
cultural dynamics, we start by reviewing some evidentiary limita-
tions of value models. We then review and integrate norm con-
structs from different literatures into a general framework. Next
we make reference to this framework to distil and delineate basic
accounts of why people adhere to norms, both classic theories and
emerging accounts. Finally we preview the articles of this special
issue on norms and cultural dynamics and some of the applied
insights gained.Limitations of value models
Value models posit that early socialization instills a general
orientation to seek particular ends, ‘‘a broad tendency to prefer
certain states of affairs over others’’ (Hofstede, 1980, p. 19).
Value orientations such as individualism and egalitarianism are
proposed to explain international variation in organizationalbehavior. However cross-national differences are moderated by
many contexts and conditions. Compared to Chinese students,
American students attribute outcomes in more individualistic,
person-centered ways, but this divergence manifests when the
task conditions demand a snap judgment, not when they afford
deliberation (Briley & Aaker, 2006; Chiu, Morris, Hong, & Menon,
2000). On creativity tasks, the novelty of solutions is higher for
Israelis than Singaporeans as predicted by individualism, but the
difference appears when they work in teams, not when they work
solo (as cited in Erez & Nouri, 2010). Likewise, Himalayan expedi-
tions are more likely to summit if from more hierarchical cultures,
but this is true only for team expeditions, not solo expeditions
(Anicich, Swaab, & Galinsky, 2015). If cultural patterns were car-
ried by broad inner values, one would expect them to manifest
generally across task conditions and social contexts. If anything,
values would be expressed more when a person acts solo, without
potential inﬂuences from others, than when acting as a member of
a team. While dimensions such as individualism and hierarchism
are useful for explaining ways cultures differ, conceptualizing cul-
ture as values does not work well to explain when cultures differ.
Throughout the 1990s cross-cultural researchers reﬁned value
scales, grasping for a version that would mediate effects of national
culture on organizational judgments and behaviors, but evidence
has been mixed at best (see Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier,
2002; Morris & Leung, 2000). The GLOBE study, contrary to expec-
tations, found negative associations between cultural values and
cultural practices (see Taras, Steel, & Kirkman, 2010). Many impor-
tant international differences in workplace behavior do not corre-
late substantially with values (Fischer & Smith, 2003; Kirkman,
Lowe, & Gibson, 2006). Recent research suggests that cultural dif-
ferences may be carried by values only in some behavior domains
such as ethical decisions (Fischer, 2006) and under task conditions
that focus attention inwards such as privacy and reﬂection (see
Leung & Morris, 2014).
As for the macro question of how cultures reproduce, spread
and evolve, value research has assumed a high degree of historical
stability. Hofstede (1993, p. 92) proposed that ‘‘national cultures
change only very slowly if at all.’’ Huntington argued in The Clash
of Civilizations (1993) that timeless cultural–religious values drive
political conﬂicts: Islamic Terrorism in the Middle East in recent
years reﬂects the same values that drove the conquest of Spain
in the 700s. But empirical evidence challenges the premise that
civilizations or even countries hold unchanging values. In World
Value Survey data from the early 1980s until 1998, Inglehart and
Baker (2000) found evidence that country-level values change with
economic conditions. Economic growth precipitated a shift toward
more individualist values (secularism and self-expression, in the
Inglehart model), whereas economic decline especially in
ex-Communist countries precipitated a shift toward more collec-
tivist values (tradition and survival values). Content analyses of
books (Michel et al., 2011) show a longer-term trend of rising indi-
vidualism in the US. Twenge, Campbell, and Gentile (2013) found
the increased frequency of individualist concepts (e.g., ‘‘indepen-
dent,’’ ‘‘individual,’’ ‘‘unique’’). Greenﬁeld (2013) found that words
reﬂecting a collectivist worldview (‘‘obliged’’) declined from 1800
to 2000 whereas those reﬂecting an individualist lifestyle
(‘‘choose’’) increased, tracking the population’s shift from agrarian
to urban lifestyles. These ﬁndings challenge the premise that value
orientations are homeostatic, self-replicating systems; individual-
ist values arise from afﬂuence and industrialized lifestyles.
Grossmann and Varnum (2015) tracked US individualism over
150 years using a number of aggregate measures (book content,
baby names, etc.) and investigating a wide array of antecedents—
economic change, pathogen prevalence, urbanization—and
time-lagged analyses found that changes in economic structure
predicted changes in individualism. In sum, the premise of stable,
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ported by longitudinal evidence.1Elements of norms
‘‘Norm’’ has many meanings in ordinary language and in social
science jargon. It can refer to an objective pattern of behavior or a
subjective expectation. Following a norm can mean doing what is
‘‘normal’’ or common. Or it can mean doing what one ought to
do, the ‘‘normative’’ or prescribed approach. In this section we
identify key constructs that ﬁgure in theories of social norms and
organize them into an integrative framework.Objective patterns
Norms can be identiﬁed with several objective features of a
social environment. At the most basic level, norms exist in wide-
spread regularities in a group’s beliefs or behavior. For example,
just as people drive on the right in the US and on the left in the
UK, the same regularities govern how people walk in hallways
and on hiking trails. These patterns or unwritten rules in an envi-
ronment affect our behavior, as it often works best to mesh with
the behavior of the people around us. Experiencing what works
and what does not work in a social environment shapes our
defaults and expectancies through operant conditioning (Savani,
Morris, Naidu, Kumar, & Berlia, 2011). Likewise, widespread beliefs
and attitudes in a group perpetuate themselves because we seek
common ground when conversing with each other (Kashima,
2014). For instance, workers’ self-efﬁcacy depends on the attitudes
of the coworkers with whom they interact (Huselid, 1995; Savani,
Morris, de Pater, Wagner, & Ilies, 2015). People’s judgments about
social issues depend not only on their personal beliefs but also on
the widespread beliefs in their society (Leung & Bond, 2004; Leung
et al., 2007). In sum, people mirror the widespread behaviors and
beliefs in their environment to succeed in interactions and
conversations.
Another relevant feature of social environments is sanctioning.
People approve of some behaviors and disapprove of others, and
they deliver rewards and punishments accordingly. Managers
reward behaviors they approve of by recognizing some employees
with rewards, resources and promotions. Parents reward and pun-
ish children to mold their behavior to be socially acceptable. In
everyday social interactions, people get feedback when others dis-
approve of their behavior (e.g., frowning, distancing themselves,
denying exchange opportunities). Such feedback, even if people
are not aware of it at the time, shapes their behavior through con-
ditioning and colors their self-regard. In a 20-nation study of
self-regard, priorities, and self-perceived accomplishments,
Becker et al. (2014) found that positive self-regard depends less
on fulﬁlling the priorities that one personally values than on fulﬁll-
ing the priorities that prevail in one’s society. Moral norms against
selﬁsh behaviors are enforced through retaliation by the affected
and also punishment by third party observers (Fehr &
Fischbacher, 2004).
Another way that norms exist in a social environment is institu-
tionalization. Some patterns and practices come to be treated as
rules beyond matters of convention or approval. One way patterns
crystalize as institutions is through formal structure. Trafﬁc patterns
started as conventions but over time became encoded as laws.
Organizations such as police academies and driving schools
emerged to enforce and perpetuate these formal rules, lending them1 Organizational, occupational, and community cultures, may be able to maintain
more value stability than societal cultures, because attraction and attrition are strong
forces as well socialization (Schneider, 1987).greater permanence (North, 1990). Another side of institutionaliza-
tion is that arbitrary practices canbecome taken for granted (Zucker,
1987), construed as group traditions (Hobsbawm, 1983) and upheld
as sacrosanct, even nonnegotiable imperatives (Atran & Ginges,
2012). These two processes—formalization and sacralization—do
not always go together, but they are both ways through which a
practice becomes institutionalized, encoded in a community’s dis-
course, and embedded within its social structures.
Subjective representations
In addition to the objective aspects of group regularities, sanc-
tioning, and institutionalization, norms exist in subjective assump-
tions, perceptions, and expectations. In a classic study of group
conformity, Sherif (1936) found participants making judgments
about an ambiguous stimulus were affected when they heard the
judgments made by others in their group. The perceived descrip-
tive norm acts as an interpretive frame that shapes what they see.
Jacobs and Campbell (1961) found that the norm persisted through
subsequent trials of the task, even as members of the original
group were one-by-one replaced with new participants.
Increasing evidence shows that perceived descriptive norms
account for differences between national cultures in social judg-
ment tendencies. Shteynberg, Gelfand, and Kim (2009) found that
the greater tendency for an American than a Korean to blame an
individual actor rather than the social context was not carried by
value orientations (personal collectivism) but by perceptions of
one’s society’s norms. Likewise, Zou et al. (2009) found that the
greater tendency of Americans than Poles to comply with a
consistency-based persuasive appeal was not driven by differing
levels of personal individualism but by differing perceptions of
their respective societies, individualism. In such cultural habits of
thinking and behavior arise from conformity to different percep-
tions of ‘‘what most people think’’ or ‘‘what most people do.’’
Individuals within a society vary in their perceptions of its cultural
codes because no individual sees the whole public; their percep-
tions hinge upon their local social networks (O’Gorman, 1986). In
cases where public behaviors and statements do not faithfully
reﬂect private beliefs, a society or community can hold inaccurate
perceptions of its descriptive norms. Dawes (1974) found that all of
the landlords in a community were willing to rent to unmarried
couples but they estimated that only 50% of their peers would be
willing, most likely because they did not talk in public at the time
about doing so. College students hold exaggerated perceptions of
their peers’ drinking because drinking is more visible (and audible)
than sobriety (Neighbors et al., 2008). Representations of descrip-
tive norms can serve a number of important functions—not only
guides to immediate behavior but also bases for predicting others’
behavior, planning future behaviors, and social coordination.
Another subjective element is perceived injunctive norms,
representations of patterns that evoke social approval or disap-
proval. Asch (1951) found that participants conformed to an incor-
rect majority even in unambiguous judgments, so long as answers
were given publicly rather than privately. Deutsch and Gerard’s
(1955) posited that this ‘‘peer pressure’’ inﬂuence is merely overt
compliance to avoid social disapproval, whereas the inﬂuence on
ambiguous tasks involves a genuine shift in participants’ private
perceptions. To probe the role of social disapproval, Berns et al.
(2005) scanned participants’ brains as they completed an object
rotation task in the Asch conformity paradigm. Participants who
deviated in their answers from an incorrect group majority showed
activation in the threat system (amygdala), consistent with expec-
tations of disapproval and punishment. This suggests how subjects
use injunctive norms function independently of actual sanctioning,
such as alerting us to others’ possible disapproval so that we cover
or account for our action. Knowledge of social injunctions can even
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during a time of famine Ik tribespeople went out of their way to
avoid receiving gifts (which would trigger expectations of gener-
ous reciprocity) and avoid cooperative hunting (which carried
expectations of sharing the prey). How people use knowledge of
what others approve of likely depends on which others are
involved. The theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975)
posits that behavioral intentions depend largely on the assumed
approval of ‘‘important referent others’’ such as family and close
friends.2
Another way norms exist subjectively is as self-expectations or
personal norms. Schwartz (1977) distinguished ‘‘social norms,’’
the injunctive expectations that group members hold about each
other, from ‘‘personal norms,’’ the expectations a person holds
about his or her own behavior. He argued that people adhere to
social norms because they are enforced but adhere to personal
norms to express their values. While this account of personal
norms loses the sense of norms as regulators of behavior, personal
norms can be regulators with a multi-agent view of the self. For
example in psychoanalytic models self-expectations are the super-
ego’s shoulds that regulate the id’s wants. The superego forms
through ‘‘introjecting’’ the standards of parents, teachers and other
authority ﬁgures. In this spirit, Deci and Ryan (1985) proposed that
when expectations of signiﬁcant others are internalized but not
fully embraced as one’s own, the motivation to adhere comes from
avoiding guilt, an internal form of enforcement.An Integrative framework
A society’s norms exist in objective aspects of the social struc-
ture—regularities, patterns of sanctioning, and institutions—and
also exist in its members’ subjective representations—descriptive
expectations, injunctive expectations, and personal norms. Norms
involve combinations of these elements. While each of these ele-
ments can affect people’s judgment or behavior, the force of norms
in directing behavior is best understood through the inter-relations
of these objective and subjective elements. Fig. 1 shows these six
elements and traces some of the primary relationships among nor-
mative elements and their antecedents and consequences.
In the column displaying the subjective elements of norms,
arrows to judgment and behavior illustrate that inﬂuence can
come from each subjective element: perceived descriptive norms
serve as frames that shape judgments and behaviors in ambiguous
situations, perceived injunctive norms guide overt public behavior,
and personal norms can direct behavior through guilt avoidance or
value expression. As we shall see in the next section, major theo-
ries of norm adherence disagree on which of these elements are
most important and whether they work together or separately.
Given that perceived descriptive and injunctive norms are both
expectations about the group, a box contrasts these ‘‘social norms’’
that contrast with personal norms, expectations about oneself.
Arrows to subjective representations from the left indicate that
they largely reﬂect the objective social structure: Regularities are
registered as perceived descriptive norms, sanctioning that has
been noticed gives rise to perceived injunctive norms, and institu-
tionalization of rules can spur people to internalize them. [While
this last link is less obvious than the previous ones, various kinds
of evidence support it. For example, Zucker (1977) found that
Jacobs and Campbell’s (1961) cultural transmission effect ampli-
ﬁed under an institutionalization condition wherein their task
was framed as a routine in an organization undergoing retirements
and new hires.] Other relationships across these three rows could2 In later conceptualizations, their construct of subjective norms encompassed both
injunctive and descriptive norms (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp. 131–133).also be posited, but the key point for now is that because the sub-
jective elements of norms in part reﬂect the objective social struc-
ture, they likely mediate effects of the objective factors. These
indirect effects, which are crucial to understand when trying to
manage norms and their consequences, are missed by literatures
that conceptualize norms solely in terms of objective elements or
solely in terms of subjective elements.
The down arrows within the subjective expectations column
relate to the notion that people infer what ought to be from what
is (Hume’s is-ought problem). Our model suggests three distinct
steps with regard to norms: perceptions of a behavior as prevalent
beget ideas of it as socially approved, which in turn beget expecta-
tions that one personally should enact this behavior. Of course, the
opposite inference from values to facts may also occur: People may
induce perceived injunctive norms from personal norms via pro-
jection (Krueger, 1996), and induce perceived descriptive norms
from perceived injunctive norms through ingroup favoritism
(Chen, Brockner, & Chen, 2002).
In the column for objective social structure factors, the arrow
from left indicates that the normative system in a community or
society is shaped by historical and ecological conditions. While
each norm evolves through its own idiosyncratic history, a larger
point is that societies or communities vary with regard to the over-
all pervasiveness of norms (Gelfand et al., 2011). A society’s norma-
tive tightness or looseness depends on the background conditions
that shaped the society’s regularities, sanctioning and institutions.
Population density, scarcity of natural resources, wars, and expo-
sure to contagious diseases are all factors that give rise to tighter
norms. For instance, tighter societies feature greater regularity in
people’s public behaviors and greater consensus in their beliefs.
Individuals in these societies have stronger prevention motivations
(avoiding errors and mistakes), indicating more sanctioning of self
and others. The priorities of tight societies are also institutional-
ized in their criminal justice systems, which feature harsher pun-
ishments and stricter monitoring of criminals.
The down arrows in the objective social structure column rep-
resent that norms typically develop bottom up: conventions turn
into injunctions and ultimately institutions. Often practices that
a few people discover to have instrumental value can propagate
more widely through the tendency of others to imitate and coordi-
nate. These familiar regularities then becomemarkers of the group,
which are useful for distinguishing ingroup members and main-
taining ingroup cooperation, so groups encourage adherence to
these practices through sanctioning. As the practices become
imbued with more value, they often get codiﬁed, formalized, and
celebrated, and this institutionalization can result in practices sur-
viving even when no longer functional for individuals or the collec-
tivity (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Kitts, 2003). Theories of the role of
norm psychology in homo sapiens evolution propose that the psy-
chological adaptations that foster group regularities (such as the-
ory of mind and over-imitation) evolved earlier than the
adaptations that enable sanctioning (moral emotions) and institu-
tionalization (symbolic thought) (Chudek & Henrich, 2011). So the
down arrows may suggest the phylogeny of norm psychology as
well as the ontogeny through which particular norms develop.
While we posit this bottom-up direction of inﬂuence as the pri-
mary case, norms of organizations and even societies sometimes
change top down, often by a leader’s hand. For instance, in
China’s Cultural Revolution, Chairman Mao dismantled key institu-
tions such as universities and at least for a time informal patterns
of social sanctioning and behavioral regularities followed.
However, such organizational change efforts that begin with insti-
tutions—formal structures, mission statements, and rituals—risk
insufﬁcient commitment and even reactance (Kotter, 1995).
Leaders fare better by inducing new behavioral patterns ﬁrst and
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Fig. 1. An integrative model of the elements of norms and some primary interrelationships.
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The foregoing framework suggests thatnorms canaffect behavior
in manyways. But people do not always abide by the norms in their
environment or in their heads. And norms do not always spread and
persist. Normology must ask when norms have force in directing
behavior and propagate to new generations and populations.
Several major theories, incorporating different subsets of the ele-
ments that we have integrated in our framework aswell as different
goals, cognitions and emotions, capture several independent ways
that norms operate. These theories elucidate the dynamics of cul-
tural patterns carried by norms—how cultural patterns in individual
behavior change across situations, and how cultural patterns in a
population spread, diminish and evolve over time.
Along with three classic theories—internalization, social iden-
tity, and rational choice—we also describe two theories emerging
from recent work on norm psychology and cultural psychology,
which we label in terms of metaphors to navigational devices—so-
cial autopilot and social radar.
Internalization
A classic theory is that people follow the social patterns that
they have internalized as personal norms. In terms of Fig. 1, this
means that objective social structures—regularities, sanctions and
institutions—affect judgment and behavior via the personal norms
that they inculcate. Parsons (1951) proposed that personalities and
values are internalizations of a society’s norms, introjected through
participation in sustained role relationships with signiﬁcant others.
Later sociologists dismissed this ‘‘oversocialized’’ view of the per-
son that fails to account for individual differences, attitude–behav-
ior inconsistency, and social change (Wrong, 1961). Schwartz
(1977) proposed that personal norms are critical drivers of behav-
ior because they are integrated into one’s values. However, studies
of situations where personal and social norms conﬂict found that
people’s public behavior is often more determined by their percep-
tion of what the ‘‘society’’ approves of (Warner & DeFleur, 1969).
Behavioral intentions are better predicted by social norms than
personal norms (Fishbein, 1967). Recent work returns to the psy-
choanalytic concept of personal norms as introjected injunctions
that may not always control behavior but merely create guilt when
one acts otherwise (Deci & Ryan, 1985). In a study correlating var-
ious norm representations and emotions with environmental
behaviors, Thøgersen (2006) found evidence for two kinds of inter-
nalization: introjected norms, which people follow to avoid guilt,
and self-integrated norms, which people follow to express their
values.
The two forms of internalization make differing predictions
about the contexts where cultural patterns of behavior would bemanifest. Self-integrated norms would matter most in contexts
lacking strong social cues and decision domains that induce moral
reﬂection, for instance ethical decisions made in private settings
(Leung & Morris, 2014). Introjected norms are likely cognitively
linked to representations of authority ﬁgures and, as such, may
be primed by them (Baldwin, Carrell, & Lopez, 1990). This form
of internalization may itself differ across societies; after helping a
signiﬁcant other, Indians are more likely to feel satisﬁed whereas
Americans are more likely to feel dissatisﬁed and ‘‘controlled’’
(Miller, Das, & Chakravarthy, 2011). Savani, Morris, and Naidu
(2012) found that for Indians, but not Americans, priming a parent
or boss shifted their overt choices towards the options perceived to
be favored by the authority ﬁgure but did not shift their private
evaluations of the choice objects, indicating that priming induced
norm adherence rather than a change in preferences or values. In
further experiments, priming affected should judgments about
choice objects but notwant judgments, and participants who failed
to shift their choice after priming reported feelings of guilt.
Cultural patterns carried by introjected norms would be manifest,
then, in contexts that expose people to relevant authority ﬁgures
or reminders of them. Photographs of parents displayed in the
home or of company founders displayed in the workplace may
function in this way to activate norms introjected from these
authority ﬁgures. Table 1 summarizes these divergent predictions
about contexts: self-integrated norms should affect behavior in
private contexts and introjected personal norms, in contexts with
cues of authority ﬁgures.
Internalization theory provides limited insight into the dynam-
ics of cultural transmission and transformation. Internalizing
norms (whether introjection or complete self-integration) is a slow
process, requiring intensive, sustained socialization experiences.
The transmission of customs and taboos across generations can
be explained this way. However, it is hard to explain cultural
changes: How is it that time-honored traditional can vanish within
a generation? How do faded cultural themes re-emerge as salient
social movements? How do cultural practices spread to new pop-
ulations? As we shall see, cultural changes are easier explained
by theories focusing on perceived social norms rather than per-
sonal norms.
Social identity
Social identity theory holds that norm adherence is a means of
expressing belonging to a group. When people categorize them-
selves as members of a group, they undergo a basic cognitive shift
and experience themselves in terms of group-typical attributes, the
behaviors and attitudes that typify the group, rather than in terms
of more idiosyncratic personal qualities (Tajfel, 1981; Turner,
1987). In this model, people who identify with a group act on the
Table 1
Theories of cognitive and motivational processes that induce people to adhere to norms.
Theory Function Mental representations involved Corresponding cultural patterns manifest when
Internalization Self expression Self-integrated values Decisions made in private
Guilt avoidance Introjected standards Authority ﬁgures primed
Social identity Self categorization,
need for belonging
Ingroup prototype Collective identity cues, ingroup interaction, outgroup salience,
identity threats, existential threats, or leadership aspirations
Rational choice Utility maximization Descriptive norms used to coordinate Doing an activity jointly rather than solo
Perceived descriptive and injunctive norms needed
for cooperation in mixed-motive games
When conditions enable communication and sanctioning
Social autopilot Effort-free, tactical
navigation
Perceived descriptive norms Cognitively busy, ego depleted, or epistemically insecure
Social radar Identity signaling
and validation
Perceived injunctive norms Engaged in social metacognition
When facing audiences, aspirational groups, or life transitions
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which aggregates descriptive and injunctive norms rather than
considering them as independent mechanisms (e.g., Terry &
Hogg, 1996). Evidence for the group belonging mechanism comes
from experiments that arbitrarily assign strangers to two groups
and ﬁnd that participants begin acting in terms of ‘‘us’’ and ‘‘them,’’
favoring the ingroup in resource allocations and evaluations
(Kramer & Brewer, 1984). Group-related motives moderate these
tendencies: Consistent with the optimal distinctiveness hypothe-
sis, need for belonging increases conformity to the ingroup,
whereas need for distinctiveness heightens differentiation from
outgroups (Vignoles & Moncaster, 2007).
Social identity theory identiﬁes many contextual factors that
bring out relevant cultural patterns of behavior. Activating the col-
lective self as opposed to the individual self heightens the inﬂu-
ence of both descriptive and injunctive norm appeals (White &
Simpson, 2013). Communication with fellow members of a group
increases identiﬁcation, and in experiments with social dilemmas,
allowing pre-play communication increases the cooperation rate
from 34% to 69% (Dawes, 1991). Situations that make an outgroup
salient or contain threats to one’s identity also heighten adherence
to ingroup norms (Elsbach, 2003; Petriglieri, 2011). Halloran and
Kashima (2004) found that bicultural Australian aboriginals were
more affected by group primes when under the condition of mor-
tality anxiety, consistent with the hypothesis that group identiﬁca-
tions buffer people against existential threats. Individuals also
engage in prototypical behavior to earn standing within the group,
which entitles them to leadership or idiosyncrasy (van
Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003). Table 1 summarizes that cultural pat-
terns carried by ingroup prototypes would be predicted in contexts
that cue group categorization and motives to express belonging
and prototypicality.
Social identity theory offers related insights about how corre-
sponding cultural patterns would change. First, ingroup prototypes
are not only activated but also altered by exposure to salient out-
groups, as these representations are continually constructed from
the data of social perception so as to maximize similarity to
ingroup members and contrast to the salient outgroup. A newly
salient outgroup should therefore change the way a group sees
itself. For example, Hong Kong Chinese shifted, after the handover
of Hong Kong’s sovereignty from Britain to China, from an ingroup
prototype centered on Chinese ethnicity, contrasting with the
British, to one centered on cosmopolitan modernity, contrasting
with China (Lam, Lau, Chiu, Hong, & Peng, 1999). Second, cultural
habits can shift rapidly because the norms are not internalized
commitments but malleable perceptions. Third, as individuals’
motives concern groups not norms, old practices should be easily
abandoned with a change in self-categorization, such as when an
individual transitions from student to professor. New practiceswould be adopted to the extent that they come to seem group pro-
totypical. Hence, leaders can orchestrate cultural change by mak-
ing particular outgroups salient, by selectively emphasizing what
makes the group special, and then institutionalizing this framing
of prototypicality in formal structures, incentives, and public ritu-
als (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011; Turner, Reynolds, & Subašic,
2008). This implies that a diagonal arrow could be added to Fig. 1,
indicating that institutionalization can induce changes in per-
ceived social norms and not merely to personal norms.
Rational choice
Another classic account is that normative patterns emerge from
rational choices in interactions. That is, they result from choosing
instrumentally, not expressing internalized norms nor expressing
group belonging. Adherence to cultural conventions (e.g.
Americans walking on the right side of a hallway) can be under-
stood as rational equilibria in coordination games (Lewis, 1969).
In this type of game, matching your interactant’s move pays off.
There are multiple possible equilibria, but once one of them has
been established the incentive is to stick to it. However, many
interactions are less coordination games than mixed-motive
games, wherein the payoffs from defection are higher than the
payoffs from cooperating and so rationality predicts the Nash equi-
librium of mutual defection. But people do not always defect in
such interactions, which might reﬂect that consider costs and ben-
eﬁts that go beyond the game payoffs, mentally transforming the
payoff matrix (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Functionalist sociology
posits that groups develop moralized norms against defection in
mixed-motive situations (Coleman, 1990). If so, then people may
cooperate to avoid the costs of sanctioning. Bicchieri (2006) pro-
posed that if players expect that most others cooperate in this sit-
uation (perceived descriptive norm) and that others expect and
enforce this norm (perceived injunctive norm), then rational choice
can produce mutual cooperation. Evolutionary models capture
how different decision strategies fare in repeated interactions with
other strategies. Evolutionarily stable strategies resist invasion by
other strategies (Maynard Smith & Price, 1973). Historical studies
suggest that stable cooperation also depends on clear boundaries
and open communication (Ostrom, 2000).
Rational choice accounts offer several predictions about the
contexts where norm-based cultural patterns would occur. The
coordination game analysis explains conventional behavior in peo-
ple’s interactions, but it does not explain conventional behavior in
private contexts or account for conventional thinking. The rational
analysis of cooperation in mixed motive games can explain some
phenomena that are challenging for the social identity account.
In social dilemma studies that vary pre-play discussion, the topic
of conversation matters—only when participants discuss the game
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descriptive and perceived injunctive norms, do the highest levels
of subsequent cooperation appear (Bicchieri, 2002; Bicchieri &
Lev-On, 2007). As Table 1 summarizes, adherence to conventions
would be expected in contexts of social interaction and adherence
to moral norms of cooperation would be expected when the com-
munication conditions allow for promises.
Rational choice accounts provide interesting insights into cul-
tural change. Consider subcultural differences in tipping: Blacks
and Asians in the US tip less on average than Whites and this con-
tributes to problems such as discriminatory service and a lack of
restaurant options in some neighborhoods. Lynn and Brewster
(2015) found that ethnic differences in tipping intentions are medi-
ated by perceived descriptive norms (measured by ‘‘what amount
would your best friend tip?’’) and injunctive norms (‘‘what amount
does the server expect?’’). Tipping levels reﬂect rational adherence
to perceived norms rather than differing values. Inspired by this
account, interventions such as tipping guidelines on menus have
been found to change tipping levels among customers from these
groups (Seiter, Brownlee, & Sanders, 2011). Rational choice
accounts call attention to the pivotal role of norm enforcement in
cultural change, and also of second-order norm enforcement,
rewards a group provides to individuals who uphold its norms
(Hechter & Opp, 2001). Social change begins with individuals who
cease complying with a norm (activists) but it is greatly fostered
by those in positions of inﬂuence who cease norm enforcement
and second-order enforcement (norm entrepreneurs) thereby
reducing the costs for activists and inducing others to join their
ranks (Sunstein, 1996). The thousand-year-old Chinese practice of
foot binding was eliminated within several decades through a cam-
paign that targeted norm enforcement. Progressives published
essays by respected Confucian scholars against the practice and cre-
ated organizations whose members publicly pledged not to bind
their daughters’ feet and not to permit their sons to marry women
whose feet were bound (Mackie, 1996). Focusing on the costs and
beneﬁts of norm adherence exposes some of the levers through
which cultural change movements succeed. Just as the social iden-
tity account emphasizes that perceived social norms depend on
institutionalization, the rational choice account stresses that they
depend on sanctioning.
Norms as navigational tools
Whereas the social identity and rational choice theories portray
descriptive and injunctive norms as working in tandem and serving
similar functions, recent research emphasizes their functional inde-
pendence and qualitative differences. Measures of perceived
descriptive and injunctive norms independently predict
anti-environmental behaviors such as littering and park vandalism
(Cialdini et al., 1990; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993) as well as
drinking and smoking behaviors (Larimer & Neighbors, 2003).
Cialdini and colleagues have demonstrated that each kind of norm
affects behavior when in ‘‘focus,’’ such as when made salient by a
persuasive message (Reno et al., 1993). And the functioning of the
two types of norms involves different kinds of cognitions and moti-
vations (Jacobson,Mortensen, & Cialdini, 2011). Building on the ‘‘fo-
cus theory’’ of Cialdini and colleagues, we propose that these two
types of norms both function in social navigation but in different
ways. Metaphors are useful in theory development to make explicit
the underlying functionalist assumptions (Tetlock, 2002). Hence,
the use of descriptive and injunctive norms, respectively, can be
compared to a ship’s use of autopilot and radar in navigation.
Social autopilot
A ship’s autopilot enables maintaining a controlled trajectory
without constant ‘hands-on’ control by a human operator. It keepsthe ship at a steady orientation, despite shifting currents or winds,
which sufﬁces for the short term to prevent collisions. Autopilots
do not replace human navigators but enable them to brieﬂy direct
their attention elsewhere, such as checking the weather.
Adherence to perceived descriptive norms functions like an autopi-
lot in that it automatically guides immediate responses in a socially
safe direction. Evidence for automaticity is seen in that descriptive
norm messages have more impact when people are under cogni-
tive load, whereas injunctive norm messages have more impact
when people have enough attention and time to cognitively elabo-
rate (Kredentser, Fabrigar, Smith, & Fulton, 2012). Moreover,
ego-depletion (depleted willpower) ampliﬁes the force of salient
descriptive norms but dampens the effect of salient injunctive
norms (Jacobson et al., 2011; Yam, Chen, & Reynolds, 2014). The
application of descriptive norms to immediate, tactical responses
as opposed to long-term strategic planning can be seen in that
descriptive norm information affects behavior solely in the present
context (e.g. littering in the context about which descriptive infor-
mation is provided) whereas injunctive norm information affects
people across contexts (littering in other settings, Reno et al.,
1993). The function of enabling safe responses is seen in that
descriptive norm information affects people more in the presence
of uncertainty or threat (Griskevicius, Goldstein, Mortensen,
Cialdini, & Kenrick, 2006; Tesser, Campbell, & Mickler, 1983).
Autopilot theory yields unique insights about contexts and con-
ditions under which descriptive-norms-based cultural patterns
would be manifest. Cultural habits should surface under conditions
of stress, danger, or distraction. Need for Cognitive Closure (NFCC)
refers to the state of wanting to reach quick and ﬁnal answers
rather than continuing to process information. Some situational
factors, such as ambient noise, induce NFCC, and some people are
chronically high in NFCC. Either way, people in the state of NFCC
should manifest cultural habits that are carried by descriptive
norms. Cultural differences in attributional tendencies are carried
by perceived descriptive norms (Zou et al., 2009). Chiu et al.
(2000) found that cultural tendencies in attribution are most man-
ifest in situations that induce NFCC and among individuals chron-
ically high in NFCC. Culturally traditional patterns of conﬂict
resolution judgments are similarly exhibited most by individuals
chronically high in NFCC (Fu et al., 2007). Negotiators develop
shared understandings more in intra-cultural than inter-cultural
negotiations but especially with high NFCC (Liu, Friedman, &
Hong, 2012). Bicultural individuals high in NFCC are more likely
to adhere to the descriptive norms of whichever culture they are
interacting with (Chao & Chiu, 2011; Zou et al., 2009). As Table 1
summarizes, the view of descriptive norms as an autopilot entails
that corresponding cultural patterns would appear under condi-
tions of NFCC or perceived danger and need for safety.
Autopilot theory elucidates some otherwise puzzling aspects of
cultural transmission and change. As for transmission, Tam, Lee,
Kim, Li, and Chao (2012) found that parents with high NFCC place
more emphasis on perceived descriptive norms and less on their
idiosyncratic personal values when socializing their children.
Immigrants high in NFCC adopt host culture norms more quickly
thanothers, unless they arrivewith aheritage culture social network
in which case they are slower than others (Kosic, Kruglanski, Pierro,
& Mannetti, 2004). People pick up norms automatically and implic-
itly from television (Weisbuch & Ambady, 2009) and new cultural
settings (Kitayama, Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003). As for cul-
tural change, the autopilot process explains dramatic changes that
elude other accounts. First, people’s experience-based perceptions
of descriptive norms are biased by how others’ public opinions
and behaviors differ from their private beliefs and behaviors, and
practices that are propped up by these mistaken perceptions can
be reduced by presenting people with better information. Public
opinion surveys—which tell people more objectively what their
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repeal of Prohibition (Robinson, 1932) and the civil rights era drop in
US racial segregation (O’Gorman, 1986). As current-day shifts in atti-
tudes to gay marriage illustrate, the dependence of an attitude on
perceptions of peers’ behavior can lead to cascades; as the percent-
age of states allowinggaymarriage rises (from10% to20% to30%and
so on), perceptions of the norm shift, and not only progressives but
also moderates join the bandwagon. Third, the dependence of
behavior on a judgment about typical beliefs or behaviors helps to
understand why some cultural forms are sticky and stable rather
than constantly in ﬂux. Sperber (1996) propose that the mutation
of cultural forms as they are re-produced is not random; evolution
drifts toward ‘‘attractors’’ – ideas or behaviors that are psychologi-
cally easier to represent, like round numbers. Kuran and Sunstein
(1999) propose that arguments that are easy to express gain rapid
currency because they get voiced inmedia soundbites and this gives
rise to availability cascades, misjudgments that the arguments are
widely believed and ensuing repetitions of the arguments.
Social radar
A ship’s radar enables a vision of its location relative to other
vessels and landmarks—ships to follow or avoid, reefs to be skirted,
and harbors to target. The device sends a radio signal outward that
is reﬂected back and received, a loop that narrows or expands as
the ship moves providing feedback to enable course corrections.
Radar does not automatically steer the ship; it provides informa-
tion that a human operator can use strategically. Likewise people
use their knowledge of what different identity groups approve of
deliberately not automatically; we are not social-approval maxi-
mizers any more than utility maximizers. People adhere to the
tastes of identity groups selectively and strategically (Bourdieu,
1984; Englis & Solomon, 1995). Like a social radar, acting in line
with the injunctive norms of identity groups is a looping process
of sending a signal and having it reﬂected in order to validate one’s
position (Belk, Bahn, & Mayer, 1982; Goffman, 1959; Strauss,
1977).3 It requires effort and willpower, as injunctive norms often
entail curbing one’s selﬁsh appetites, overriding wants to act on
shoulds. As noted above, injunctive norm information affects people
more when they are not cognitively busy nor ego depleted (Jacobson
et al., 2011; Kredentser et al., 2012; Yam et al., 2014) and affects
them across situations rather than only in one given behavioral con-
text (Reno et al., 1993). The goal of social approval heightens compli-
ance with injunctive norms and afterwards people feel more conﬂict
and more interpersonal self-awareness than those complying with
descriptive norms (Jacobson et al., 2011). For descriptive norms, per-
ceptions of proximal groups (friends) and distal groups (typical stu-
dents on campus) exerted independent positive effects on drinking
behavior; for injunctive norms, perceptions of proximal groups were
positively related but distal groups were unrelated or even nega-
tively related (Cho, 2006; Neighbors et al., 2008). Even within a
group, people take their signals about injunctive norms selectively
from key individuals. Paluck and Shepherd (2012) found that the
perceived injunctive norms about bullying in a high school could
be changed by targeting key referent individuals, identiﬁed through
social network structure.
Social radar theory provides some distinctive insights about the
contexts in which cultural patterns carried by injunctive norms
would be acquired and exhibited. As for acquisition, individuals
oriented toward cultural metacognition are quicker than others
to learn injunctive norms of a new culture, consistent with a strate-
gic learning process (Morris, Savani, & Naidu, 2015). With regard to3 This is not a matter of self-veriﬁcation, ﬁnding others that see your personality in
the way that you see it (Swann, 1983), but of cultural validation, making an identity
claim and having that claim granted by relevant gatekeepers, people with a legitimate
stake in the relevant cultural capital.which context-related cultural patterns surface, an obvious condi-
tion for a signaling process is an audience. East Asian tendencies to
avoid choosing unique options in choice sets increase under condi-
tions that cue an audience and go away when there is no possibil-
ity of appearing selﬁsh to others (Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & Schug,
2008). Second, priming identity groups should affect adherence in
a way that depends on the dominant identity motives. Priming
Chinese-American students with Chinese cultural images
increased their cooperation so long as they were playing with
friends rather than strangers (Wong & Hong, 2005). Zou et al.
(2009) found that biculturals high in dis-identiﬁcation with one
of their cultural groups (the motive for distinction from the group)
responded to cultural image primes with a contrast effect
(Benet-Martínez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002; Mok & Morris, 2009,
2013). Third, people should respond to outgroups in more variable
ways that social identity theory portrays. For aspirational referent
groups people hold accurate and complex notions of approved-of
behaviors, more so than for groups they wish to dissociate from,
dissociative referent groups (Englis & Solomon, 1995). Whereas
priming dissociative groups induces contrast effects in consumer
choices, priming aspirational groups evokes assimilation effects
(Zou, Morris, Carranza, & Fox, 2015). When entering a new career,
country, or lifestyle, people provisionally adhere to its tastes and
look for validation, negotiating a new identity via injunctive norm
adherence (Ibarra & Barbulescu, 2010). Table 1 summarizes these
predictions that relevant cultural patterns should arise in the con-
texts of audiences, aspirational groups, and life transitions.
The social radar account also provides unique insights into cul-
tural transmission and change. The identity negotiation process
elucidates why developing a culture in a new organization is difﬁ-
cult; there are no old-timers to validate identity claims. Cultures
form more easily and rapidly when members import norms from
a prior organization (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985). A cultural
change dynamic that social radar theory explains is a group’s aban-
donment of consumption patterns that other groups have adopted,
so as to not to be mistaken for them. Consistent with this, Berger
and Heath (2008) found that groups abandon patterns only in con-
sumer domains that are identity relevant (e.g. clothing rather than
DVD players) and only to the extent that the misidentiﬁcation is
perceived as costly. This entails strategies for leading cultural
changes. Linking a behavior (binge drinking) to dissociative out-
groups can induce a group to abandon it (Berger & Rand, 2008).Summary
We have reviewed a succession of theories about how norms
inﬂuence behavior and evolve over time. People follow norms to
express their values, to avoid guilt, to feel group belonging and dis-
tinctiveness, to maximize instrumental payoffs and to navigate the
social environment tactically and strategically. These are all inde-
pendent ways that various elements of norms portrayed in Fig. 1
take force over thoughts and behavior, and they imply additional
links among these elements, beyond the ones portrayed. Each
implies different moderating conditions (listed in Table 1) for
norm-governed behavior and the cultural patterns they carry. As
we shall see, the contributions in this special issue inform a num-
ber of these ways that norms can account for cultural dynamics.New insights from the special issue
The articles of this special issue push the frontiers of normology
and cultural research. While each individual article makes multiple
contributions, we will only preview some of them in terms of the
three major causal questions illustrated in Fig. 1: how background
conditions set the stage for cultural patterns, how the objective
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expectations, and how these subjective expectations ultimately
affect judgment and behavior.Background conditions
Amajor contribution to norm-based cultural research is research
correlating normative tightness across countries with historical
experiences such as dense population, invasion, and disease
(Gelfand et al., 2011). Roos, Gelfand, Nau, and Lun (2015) provide
complementary evidence for this macro-level hypothesis and elab-
orate the relevant mechanism using agent-based modeling. In their
simulations, recurrent threats to a group select for tighter norms.
Speciﬁcally, harsh sanctioning and a greater regularity of behavior
promote ingroup cooperation and coordination, and thereby
increase the likelihood that the society will survive the recurrent
threats.
The evolution of normative systems is affected not only by
external threats but internal structural properties such as mobility.
Whitson, Wang, Kim, Cao, and Scrimpshire (2015) conducted a ser-
ies of experiments to test the hypothesis that the degree of job
mobility in a society affects how people sanction norm violators
using social inclusion vs. exclusion. In a low job mobility context
such as Korea, where people stay in the same organization for
the long term, social exclusion of the norm violator is employed
less than in a high job mobility context such as the United States,
as low mobility contexts make it difﬁcult and costly to weaken ties
with the norm violator. Instead people in low mobility contexts
sanction norm violators through monetary punishment. As such,
these ﬁndings support a rationalistic approach to norms as pat-
terns that arise from maximizing individual or collective utility.
Background factors such as disease may matter not only as his-
torical conditions for tightness but also as proximal triggers for the
spread of some kinds of norm-related behaviors. Dutta and Rao
(2015) argue that anxiety about disease contagion primes concerns
about cultural contamination by outgroups. In a historical study of
the 1857 Bengal mutinies against the British Raj, they found that
army regiments incidentally exposed to discourse about a conta-
gious disease (cholera) became more likely to mutiny against their
British superordinates. Although wedge rumors about British dis-
respect for local religious practices circulated throughout the coun-
try, the precondition of contagion anxiety determined which
regiments came to believe and act upon these ideas.From objective structures to subjective expectations
While past work on norms has assumed that perceived descrip-
tive norms largely reﬂect objective regularities (see Fig. 1), there
has been little investigation of the psychological processes through
which they form. Kwan, Yap, and Chiu (2015) posit that individuals
arrive at representations of their peers’ familiarity with objects and
practices through an implicit process of tallying their exposure to
these things in the cultural setting. Their experiments demonstrate
that subliminal exposure to an object does not create a sense of per-
sonal familiarity but implicitly registers in assumptions about how
familiar the object is to others, which can serve as an autopilot for
choices that will be accepted by others. This process has important
implications for how leaders and activists may be able to redirect
people’s attitudes and behaviors through changing the prevalence
of relevant objects and practices in the environment. However,
Kwan and colleagues also advance an interesting argument about
when these perceived group tendencies are used as basis for one’s
judgment. They draw upon social identity theory to show that
belonging and distinctiveness motives determine how much indi-
viduals are guided by their perceptions of their group.The traditional wisdom that descriptive norms give rise to
injunctive norms is shown in the down arrow in Fig. 1. However,
the reverse causal direction is also possible. Eriksson, Strimling,
and Coultas (2015) produce consistent evidence from eight studies
for a strong association between descriptive norms (what is ‘‘com-
mon’’) and injunctive norms (what is ‘‘moral’’). That people may
automatically infer what is approved of from what is common
and vice versa suggests that norms may propagate in a society
via this mutual inference process—people seek approval by doing
what is prevalent, and the practice becomes more common as it
takes on approval. This contribution speaks to the possibility of
top-down cultural change. As Orwell described, when people are
induced to enforce norms they become very motived to project
that others share their attitudes and habits. Once they come to
see the habits as widespread, they may adhere to them reﬂexively
via the autopilot mechanism and not just deliberately via the social
radar mechanism.
From subjective expectations to judgment and behavior
Several theories of normative force predict greater adherence to
norms in public or the presence of an audience. This factor may be
relevant not only to contextual variation within cultures but also to
differences between cultures. Savani, Wadhwa, Uchida, Ding, and
Naidu (2015) show that the greater Indian (vs. American) propen-
sity to disassociate choices from private preferences arises not only
from the greater preference for allocentrism in decision making in
Indian culture but also from the greater sensitivity to social cues in
Indian contexts. Consistent with the social radar account, Indians
made more choices inconsistent with their private preferences in
the presence of social monitoring cues (i.e., an image of human
eyes). Consistent with the optimal distinctiveness argument of
social identity theory, Indians disassociate choices from prefer-
ences when social feedback primed need for group belonging as
opposed to need for distinctiveness.
A perennial question when considering societal cultures and
organizational cultures is what kinds of norms enable people to
leverage their talents. Through their analysis of archival data,
Swaab and Galinsky (2015) show that the national soccer teams
of countries with more egalitarian norms performed better in
international competitions. Consistent with the causal chain in
Fig. 1, the effect of institutional egalitarianism on behaviors (player
development and team success) was mediated by subjective
egalitarianism.
Past theories identify contexts of decision making with more or
less weight on norms, MacCoun (2015) develops a general, formal
model of behavioral decisions as a function of rational, evidentiary
proof and social proof from descriptive norms. Exploring models
that allow the weight on both of these parameters to vary,
MacCoun ﬁts the data from a wide variety of belief transmission
situations – from the Ash experiments, to jury dynamics, to histor-
ical cases of ‘‘tipping point’’ cultural change. This work is an impor-
tant conceptual bridge between social learning based models of
cultural evolution (Boyd & Richerson, 1994) and models of group
decision making in social psychology and organizational behavior.
Transmission across generations
Finally several articles contribute to our understanding of inter-
generational cultural transmission. Whereas memetic accounts of
cultural transmission (Dawkins, 1989) suggests that cultural ele-
ments spread by replicating themselves, normological accounts
accounts entail that cultural patterns are re-produced more vari-
ably as people construct imperfect representations of their group’s
regularities and expectations and act on them inconsistently as a
function of motives and situations.
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increases acquisition of and adherence to cultural patterns related
to descriptive norms. Hence, groups with higher NFCC should have
higher levels of cultural continuity and stability across generations.
Consistent with this idea, Livi, Kruglanski, Pierro, Mannetti, and
Kenny (2015) propose that NFCC predicts a greater tendency for
old-timers to ‘‘freeze’’ on a cultural practice and newcomers to
the group to ‘‘seize’’ upon established group norms. Accordingly,
groups with high (vs. low) NFCC have more persistent and stable
norms across generations, although the results indicate transmis-
sion mainly through the latter process of newcomers’ seizing upon
established norms.
Cultural elements carried by different kinds of norms should
exhibit different kinds of transmission dynamics. In an innovative
experiment using a joint foraging task in which newcomers learn
from interaction with old-timers, Kashima et al. (2015) investi-
gated two aspects of culture with different normological bases:
behaviors and implicit attitudes (akin to personal norms).
Strikingly, variations in the learning conditions revealed that these
two aspects of culture are learned in different ways under different
conditions. Behavioral practices are learned through reproducing
old-timers’ behavior, a process fostered by explicit instruction.
Implicit attitudes are learned through newcomers’ social infer-
ences about old-timers’ intentions, a process fostered when
old-timers’ patterns are institutionalized as traditions. These ﬁnd-
ings suggest that neither cultural behaviors nor cultural attitudes
get from old-timers to newcomers through simply replicating
themselves, but instead through different ways that newcomers
construct subjective representations of the old-timers’ ways.Managerial implications
We have proposed a normology framework and delineated pro-
cesses through which norms take force over thoughts and behav-
iors, many of which are further elucidated by the articles of this
special issue. Descriptive, injunctive, and personal norms operate
independently and in conjunction as they are engaged through dif-
ferent motives that operate in different task conditions and social
contexts. We have also discussed how norms get propagated to
new generations and populations. This knowledge has important
applied implications for management and leadership. We close
by previewing a few of these that are further elaborated in the arti-
cles that follow.Directing behavior through norms
To achieve coordination in organizations, managers must direct
the behavior of employees. Our enumeration of norm mechanisms
(see Table 1) illustrates that different bases of norm adherence can
be induced in different ways and different contexts. In societies
where people introject the expectations of authority ﬁgures,
reminders of these ﬁgures (e.g., photos of founders and leaders)
can increase adherence to introjected norms. Threats such as con-
tagious disease or conﬂicts increase compliance with injunctive
norms (Dutta & Rao, 2015; Roos et al., 2015). Managers who rely
on norms to regulate employee behaviors and performance also
need to be aware of the limitations of and contextual nature of nor-
mative inﬂuence. Norms affect behaviors and performance (Swaab
& Galinsky, 2015), but norms are not the sole determinants of
behaviors (MacCoun, 2015). Normative inﬂuence is stronger within
interdependent (vs. independent) societies, and when behaviors
can (vs. cannot) be publicly monitored (Savani, Wadhwa, et al.,
2015).
Other times managers seek to change perceived norms. As
repeated exposure to practices induces the perception of thesebeing familiar and typical in the group, managers can do so
through shaping the environment, not only the objective behav-
ioral regularities but also the information about fellow employees
that people encounter in the workplace and on company intranets.
This should be particularly effective when coupled with strategies
to increase employees’ motivation for belonging to the group
(Kwan et al., 2015). Perceptions that practices are common in the
organization may engender judgments that these practices are
approved or morally enjoined by coworkers (Eriksson et al.,
2015). As public health research increasingly shows, sometimes
problematic behaviors result simply from group members’ biased
perception of descriptive and injunctive norms. When this is the
case, making available data about employee behaviors through
surveys and other methods sufﬁces to reduce the problematic
behavior. This method is low in cost and also more palatable than
top-down requirements or ﬁnes. To change a more pervasive
behavior that has become a norm, a campaign requires employees
who cease complying and opinion leaders who cease enforcing,
thereby reducing the costs for others to join the movement.
In sum, managers can direct behavior by increasing adherence
to prosocial norms and decreasing adherence to antisocial norms.
Managing through activating norm adherence (‘‘nudging’’) is safer
than managing through enforcing requirements (‘‘pushing’’) that
can induce reactance and resentment, or promising incentives
(‘‘luring’’) that can induce unintended and unforeseen responses.
Leading organizational cultures
Managers who seek to sustain a company’s culture must check
that they understand it. Predominantly ﬁrms have assessed and
represented their cultures in terms of values. Values are useful
ways of summarizing a company’s priorities but it is the more
speciﬁc level of norms at which a culture guides behavior. Hence
we propose that ﬁrms would gain valuable insights from studying
their cultures normologically. Speciﬁcally, assessing employees’
subjective expectations (perceived descriptive and injunctive
norms) could inspire novel insights beyond the generalities of val-
ues (see Cooke & Rousseau, 1988). But, as Fig. 1 illustrates, the pre-
vailing subjective expectations among employees should be
interpreted in light of objective patterns in both the formal organi-
zation and the informal organization (behavioral regularities, sanc-
tioning, and institutionalization). Subjective expectations
primarily reﬂect the objective social environment.
Old-timers in an organization are important agents for sustain-
ing its culture. Leaders can foster transmission of cultural attitudes
by emphasizing the institutionalization of old-timers’ patterns and
directing newcomers to actively think about the reasons for
old-timers’ behaviors; they can foster the transmission of practices
by encouraging explicit instruction by old-timers (Kashima et al.,
2015). Transmission of traditional patterns should be particularly
effective when there is a collective need for cognitive closure such
as in conditions of threat or uncertainty (ﬁnancial crisis, market
change, etc.) (Livi et al., 2015).
Leaders who seek to transform organizational cultures can also
beneﬁt from a normological perspective. If they want to induce a
change in employees’ perceptions of the frequency or approval of
particular behaviors in the organization, or employees’ internaliza-
tion of organizational norms, Fig. 1 offers some tentative sugges-
tions about which changes to the objective social structure might
bring about the desired changes in subjective expectations. A nor-
mological perspective elucidates that change agents have many
levers to pull in transforming cultures. However, as Roos et al.
(2015) elucidate, group norms become tighter and less open to
change in threatening environments.
Strong cultures help not only for coordination but also for moti-
vation and recruitment. Accordingly, managers can strengthen
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ﬁrm distinct from competitors and highlighting these distinctive
practices in formal organizational structures, incentives, and public
rituals. However, strong organizational identiﬁcation can make
organizational changes particularly difﬁcult. In mergers and acqui-
sitions, managers may need to reduce perceptions of distinctive-
ness in order to foster integration. A normological perspective
reveals how organizational cultures can be malleable and
manageable.Conclusion
This special issue lays the groundwork for a fuller understand-
ing of culture and its role in organizational behavior. Research on
norms in different disciplines offers new insights beyond tradi-
tional value models about cultural dynamics: how do conditions
and contexts draw out culturally inﬂected thoughts and behaviors,
and how do aggregate level cultural patterns spread and transform
over time. We have integrated normological concepts and theories
to set the stage for the contributions made by the articles in this
special issue. Our hope is that these contributions from different
academic disciplines, using different methodologies and levels of
analysis, will provoke new insights about culture in organizational
behavior and other ﬁelds.References
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